21 May 2019
Software systems are prone to the build up of cruft - deficiencies in internal quality that make it harder than it would ideally be to modify and extend the system further. Technical Debt is a metaphor, coined by Ward Cunningham, that frames how to think about dealing with this cruft, thinking of it like a financial debt. The extra effort that it takes to add new features is the interest paid on the debt.
Imagine I have a confusing module structure in my code base. I need to add a new feature. If the module structure was clear, then it would take me four days to add the feature but with this cruft, it takes me six days. The two day difference is the interest on the debt.
What most appeals to me about the debt metaphor is how it frames how I think about how to deal with this cruft. I could take five days to clean up the modular structure, removing that cruft, metaphorically paying off the principal. If I only do it for this one feature, that's no gain, as I'd take nine days instead of six. But if I have two more similar features coming up, then I'll end up faster by removing the cruft first.
Is High Quality Software Worth the Cost?
A common debate in software development projects is between spending time on improving the quality of the software versus concentrating on releasing more valuable features. Usually the pressure to deliver functionality dominates the discussion, leading many developers to complain that they don't have time to work on architecture and code quality. This debate is based on the assumption that increasing quality also increases costs, which is our common experience. But the counter-intuitive reality is that internal software quality removes the cruft that slows down developing new features, thus decreasing the cost of enhancing the software.
Stated like that, this sounds like a simple matter of working the numbers, and any manager with a spreadsheet should figure out the choices. Sadly since we CannotMeasureProductivity, none of these costs are objectively measurable. We can estimate how long it takes to do a feature, estimate what it might be like if the cruft was removed, and estimate the cost of removing the cruft. But our accuracy of such estimates is pretty low.
Given this, usually the best route is to do what we usually do with financial debts, pay the principal off gradually. On the first feature I'll spend an extra couple of days to remove some of the cruft. That may be enough to reduce the interest rate on future enhancements to a single day. That's still going to take extra time, but by removing the cruft I'm making it cheaper for future changes to this code. The great benefit of gradual improvement like this is that it naturally means we spend more time on removing cruft in those areas that we modify frequently, which are exactly those areas of the code base where we most need the cruft to be removed.
Thinking of this as paying interest versus paying of principal can help decide which cruft to tackle. If I have a terrible area of the code base, one that's a nightmare to change, it's not a problem if I don't have to modify it. I only trigger an interest payment when I have to work with that part of the software (this is a place where the metaphor breaks down, since financial interest payments are triggered by the passage of time). So crufty but stable areas of code can be left alone. In contrast, areas of high activity need a zero-tolerance attitude to cruft, because the interest payments are cripplingly high. This is especially important since cruft accumulates where developers make changes without paying attention to internal quality - the more changes, the greater risk of cruft building up.
The metaphor of debt is sometimes used to justify neglecting internal quality. The argument is that it takes time and effort to stop cruft from building up. If there new features that are needed urgently, then perhaps it's best to take on the debt, accepting that this debt will have to be managed in the future.
The danger here is that most of the time this analysis isn't done well. Cruft has a quick impact, slowing down the very new features that are needed quickly. Teams who do this end up maxing out all their credit cards, but still delivering later than they would have done had they put the effort into higher internal quality. Here the metaphor often leads people astray, as the dynamics don't really match those for financial loans. Taking on debt to speed delivery only works if you stay below the design payoff line of the DesignStaminaHypothesis, and teams hit that line in weeks rather than months.
There are regular debates whether different kinds of cruft should be considered as debt or not. I found it useful to think about whether the debt is acquired deliberately and whether it is prudent or reckless - leading me to the TechnicalDebtQuadrant.
As far as I can tell, Ward first introduced this concept in an experience report for OOPSLA 1992. It has also been discussed on the wiki.
Ward Cunningham has a video talk where he discusses this metaphor he created.
Dave Nicolette expands on Ward's view of technical debt with a fine case study of what I refer to as Prudent Intentional debt
A couple of readers sent in some similarly good names. David Panariti refers to ugly programming as deficit programming. Apparently he originally started using a few years ago when it fitted in with government policy; I suppose it's natural again now.
Scott Wood suggested "Technical Inflation could be viewed as the ground lost when the current level of technology surpasses that of the foundation of your product to the extent that it begins losing compatibility with the industry. Examples of this would be falling behind in versions of a language to the point where your code is no longer compatible with main stream compilers."
Steve McConnell brings out several good points in the metaphor, particularly how keeping your unintended debt down gives you more room to intentionally take on debt when it's useful to do so. I also like his notion of minimum payments (which are very high to fix issues with embedded systems as opposed to web sites).
Aaron Erickson talks about Enron financing.
Henrik Kniberg argues that it's older technical debt that causes the greatest problem and that it's wise to a qualitative debt ceiling to help manage it.
Erik Dietrich discusses the human cost of technical debt: team infighting, atrophied skills, and attrition.
I originally published this post on October 1 2003. I gave it a thorough rewrite in April 2019.